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The 1930s depression growth of  unionism is the most studied and discussed 
period in U.S. labor history. Many analysts view the decade as a turning point 
in the development of the American  labor relations  system. Participation  in 
unions exploded in the 1930s, with the sharpest increase in density occurring 
with the Supreme Court’s decision upholding  the National  Labor Relations 
(Wagner) Act in 1937 (see fig. 8.1, below). The Wagner Act, modified by the 
Taft-Hartley Act (1947) and ensuing legislation, continues to provide the legal 
framework for establishing unions in the United States. The 1930s growth of 
unionism was also associated with the development of industrial unions and 
the formation of a new national grouping of unions, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO). In explaining  the successful unionization  of the blue- 
collar workforce  in the  1930s, labor historians place great emphasis on the 
Wagner Act, the dramatic events surrounding the formation of  the CIO, the 
development of the industrial union, and the specific battles and personalities 
of the era-John  L. Lewis, Philip Murray, Walter Reuther, President Roosevelt, 
among others. It was an era of legends. 
Was the depression growth of U.S. unionism a unique event in trade union 
history or was it part and parcel of the normal pattern of union development? 
Is there an underlying social dynamic behind the growth in unionization? Did 
the 1930s leave an institutional legacy that makes this period a defining mo- 
ment in the history of US.  labor relations; and, if so, what is that legacy? 
Because the expansion of unionism in a single country in a single period 
leaves much scope for interpretation  and only limited possibility  for testing 
interpretations (where do we find the appropriate counterfactual to any given 
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interpretation?), I consider the U.S. depression-era experience in light of devel- 
opments in other countries and in other time periods. I find that unionism gen- 
erally grows in discontinuous spurts and that the period of  the Great Depres- 
sion was one of union growth in many countries. This leads me toward an 
explanation of  the depression experience in  terms  of  a  general theory  of 
employer-employee conflict over organization as opposed to an explanation 
rooted in specific events and personalities in the depression and United States. 
Specific events and people ignite processes and potentially impel those pro- 
cesses in particular directions at formative times, but the key to understanding 
union growth lies in the endogenous social process, not in the historical details, 
which vary from period to period and country to country. As to the legacy of 
the depression spurt, the 1960s-to-  1990s  decline of private sector union density 
to predepression levels belies the view, prevalent 20 or 30 years ago, that the 
New Deal established a stable system of collective bargaining. The legacy of 
the depression-era spurt is quite different: an institutional framework for estab- 
lishing unions and collective bargaining that has become outmoded from the 
vantage point of workers, unions, and firms. 
8.1  Spurts of Unionism: The Quantitative Record 
Statistics on union membership for the United States and other countries 
show that trade union growth takes the form of  discontinuous “spurts” rather 
than  gradual logistic growth to  some equilibrium value. The expansion of 
unionism in the depression era was an exceptionally large spurt but one with 
parallels in U.S. history and in other countries as well. 
8.1.1  The American Experience 
Figure 8.1 shows the pattern of union density in the United States from 1880 
through 1995. For most of the period, unions were concentrated in the private 
sector, so the density figures largely represent that sector. In the 1960s, how- 
ever, public sector unionism grew substantially, but the overall pattern is still 
dominated by  developments in the private sector. “Optimetrics” shows five 
spurts in union density: 1880-86,  1897-1904,  1916-21,  1934-39,  and 1942- 
45. Whether we should divide the depression-era growth of unionism into the 
1934-39  and 1942-45  spurts is questionable. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) series on union membership, on which I rely, shows a break, but the 
series of  union membership reported by  Troy  and Sheflin (1985) does not. 
Commons et al. (1966), Dunlop (1948), and most analysts differentiate be- 
tween the two periods, and I shall do so also. In addition, there is a spurt in 
public sector unionism from about 1962 to 1972 or so. 
Going beyond the visual picture, the notion and treatment of  spurts in union 
growth can be developed further. By a spurt I mean a sharp concentrated epi- 
sode of union growth. In such an episode, membership should grow more rap- 
idly in a few contiguous years than would be expected by any model of random 268  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.1  Changes in Union Density during Spurts and Other Periods, 
1880-1995 
Year 
Years When Density 
Density  Grew  Fell 
Years When Density 
Average  Average 
Initial  Final  Years  Density  Years  Density 
No. of  Change in  No. of  Change in 
Spurts 
1883-1 986  2.8  9.9  3  2.4 
1899-1904  4.9  11.9  5  1.4 
1916-21  9.6  17.4  5  I .6 
1934-39  11.5  27.6  5  3.2 
1942-45  25  34.2  3  3.1 










1.7  2.8 
9.9  4.9 
11.9  9.6 
17.4  11.5 
27.6  25 
34.2  14.9 
34.2  26.4 
26.4  14 
0.4 
0.3  6  -1.3 
0.4  6  -0.8 
0.4  7  -1.2 
1  .o  2  -1.8 
0.5  40  -0.6 
0.5  17  -0.7 
0.5  23  -0.6 
All  33  0.5  61  -0.8 
Source: Tabulated from union density statistics in table 8A.2. 
Nora: Average change in density in a spurt period is simply the average annual change in the 
specified years. Average change in density in a nonspurt period is the average annual change in 
the years when density grew and when density fell. The “all” figures are the averages of the change 
in density in the specified spurt and nonspurt years. 
fluctuations in growth, even with some autocorrelation in the rate of  growth. 
In  addition, for spurts to be growth phenomena, the pattern of  increases in 
union density should differ from the pattern of decreases in union density dur- 
ing periods of decline. 
The statistical measures of  changes in U.S. union density in private sector 
spurts and in “nonspurt” periods shown in table 8.1 indicate that the designated 
periods meet these criteria. The change in density is larger in the spurt periods 
(an average annual gain of 2.2 percentage points) than in the nonspurt periods 
when density increased (an average annual gain of  0.5 percentage points) or 
than in nonspurt periods when density declined (an average annual loss of 0.8). 
The change is also highly concentrated: gains in union density are more likely 
to be clumped together than decreases in density and are more highly corre- 
lated than are decreases. The optimetrics reading of  the data is not spurious: 
spurts in growth are real. By contrast, absent the periods of spurt, U.S. union 
history is characterized by gradual erosion of union density 269  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
How  does the  1934-39  depression spurt look in this context? It had the 
largest growth of  density and of density per year of  any spurt. In contrast to 
the other spurts, it occurred in a peacetime period of high unemployment. It 
was associated with innovations in labor laws and in the nature of union organi- 
zations that created a “new unionism” in the form of industrial unions. Earlier 
spurts were associated with either substantive legal changes (during World 
Wars I and I1 the government encouraged settlement of disputes) or new forms 
of unionism (the 1897-1904  spurt was related to the formation of the American 
Federation of Labor [AFL]; the increase in unionism in the 1880s was due in 
large part to the growth of the Knights of  Labor), but not with both. Finally, 
the 1934-39  spurt was followed by the 1942-45  spurt associated with World 
War 11.  This arguably brought union strength to levels that would never have 
been achieved or maintained simply from the 1930s spurt. In  fact, between 
1939 and 1942 union density fell (though membership increased), suggesting 
that at least some of the 1930s gain in density would have eroded absent World 
war 11. 
There are two possible ways in which aggregate unionism can increase rap- 
idly in a spurt. Existing unions with given jurisdictions could greatly increase 
their representation. The Carpenters’ Union might, for example, successfully 
organize carpenters in nonunion areas. Alternatively, new or existing unions 
could expand into previously nonunion sectors. Extant data on unionization by 
industry are limited before the 1950s, but figures on membership for particular 
unions provide a disaggregated picture of the spurt process by organization. 
Before the depression expansion, most unions were organized on a craft basis, 
with explicit jurisdictions; and the pre-CIO industrial unions, such as the Min- 
ers, also had relatively narrow jurisdictions. Thus, expansion of existing unions 
would indicate organization of sectors where unions were traditionally concen- 
trated. Creation of  new  unions would indicate union growth in traditionally 
nonunion occupations or industries. Using data from Troy and  Sheflin (1985), 
I have examined the growth of individual unions during the four spurts identi- 
fied in figure 8.1 and table 8.1, and during relevant nonspurt periods. The re- 
sults of this analysis are summarized in table 8.2. Because I do not have infor- 
mation on employment within each union’s jurisdiction, I report the growth in 
terms of  percentage changes in absolute membership. While this overstates 
growth in union density in relevant jurisdictions during periods of economic 
upswing, the rates of change in union membership during the various spurts are 
so great that they invariably imply large changes in density. The table shows, in 
any case, that in a spurt nearly every union experiences membership gains. 
However, in the 1930s, a larger proportion of the growth occurred though 
the formation of new unions than in previous spurts. This helps explain the 
greater magnitude of that spurt than of previous spurts. The ubiquity of  growth 
among existing unions and the formation of new unions during the depression 
suggests a  sea change in labor-management relations that  made  this spurt 
something different. In fact, it is this sea change in the labor market that labor Table 8.2  Percentage Growth of Union Membership in Selected Unions 
during Spurts 
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Sources: Troy and Sheflin (1985, app. B) and Troy (1965, tables A1 and A2). 
Nutes: A dash means that the data were unavailable, usually because the union did not exist during 
the observation period. The Troy and Sheflin (1985) data differ somewhat from Troy (1965) for 
the same time periods. When available, I used the Troy and Sheflin data. 
"Union was newly created during this time period. 
bNumbers reported are for the period 1940-46. 
'Numbers reported are for the period 1939-46. 
dNumbers reported are for the period  1909-16. 
'Numbers reported are for the period  1901-03. 
'Numbers reported are for the period 1900-04. 
YNumbers reported are for the period 1899-1 904. 271  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
historians have  stressed in their descriptions of  the period (Bernstein 1971; 
Galenson 1960). 
Finally, note that the spurt not covered in the table, involving public sector 
workers in 1962-72,  has properties similar to those of the spurts shown in table 
8.2: rapid expansion of unionism in new areas with new or changed organiza- 
tions (the conversion of employee associations such as the National Education 
Association [NEA] into unions) and growth of existing unions under the aegis 
of legal changes (Freeman 1986). 
8.1.2  The Experience of Other Countries 
Are spurts in union growth unique to the United States, or do they character- 
ize other countries as well? Given the historically confrontational labor rela- 
tions of the United States, we might expect to see less jumpy patterns of  union 
growth in other countries. In some countries, union growth has in fact been 
less discontinuous than in the United States, but in most advanced capitalist 
countries we find a pattern similar to the U.S. experience: union growth taking 
the form of  sharp concentrated spurts in membership. Even  more striking, 
union growth spurts have occurred during roughly the same periods in most 
countries. For instance, union density rose sharply in the United States, United 
Kingdom,  Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway,  and Australia around the 
early 1900s. Density also grew during the World War I period in all countries 
for which’data exist. 
Table 8.3 provides a rough picture of the time pattern of the growth or de- 
cline of union density across countries that highlights the similarity in the tim- 
ing of spurts. The number of countries in the table differs from period to period 
due to differing availability of union membership data. There is information 
on 7 countries in the  1900s, 12 countries until the rnid-l930s/World War I1 
period when Germany and Austria are excluded because of the Nazi suppres- 
sion of free trade unions, and an increasing number of countries thereafter. The 
most striking pattern in the data is the similarity in most periods of  union 
growth across countries that enables me to label the periods as times of spurt, 
stability, or decline. Union membership shows spurts in all of the countries for 
which I have data in the 1900s, in World War I, and in the mid-l930s/World 
War I1 period. For instance, in the United Kingdom, density jumped between 
1910 and 1913 (15 percent to 23 percent), between 1916 and 1920 (26 percent 
to 45 percent), between 1939 and 1943 (32 percent to 40 percent), and between 
1945 and 1948 (39 percent to 45 percent). It grew in the majority of countries 
in the 1970s, with the United States being an outstanding exception. In other 
periods, density was stable or falling. Declines in density occurred in nearly 
all of the countries in the 1920s and in a majority of countries in the 1980s to 
mid-1990s. Density was stable in 1910-16  and in the 1950s and 1960s. 
I have given broad time groupings in the table and have, in particular, com- 
pressed the mid-l930s/World War I1 period into one interval, because the de- 
pression and war occurred at different times among the countries. The table is 272  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.3  A Century of Change in Unionization in the Developed World 
Period 
Mean  No. of Countries 
Characterization  Density  Characterization 
Qualitative  Change in  That Fit Qualitative 
1900s 
19  10-1 6 
World War I 
1920s 





Increasing union density 
Stability 
Spurt in density 
Fall in density 
Spurt in density 
Stability 
Stability 
Growth with diversity 










7 of 7 rise“ 
6 rise; 6 fallb 
12 of 12  rise 
10 of 12  falF 
10 of  10 rised 
10 of 14 modest changes‘ 
12 of  14 modest changes‘ 
13 of 18 rise 
13 of 18 fall 
Sources: Visser (1989, 1992). Bain and Price (1980), Schneider (1991). and OECD (1991). 
Notes: Countries covered are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Can- 
ada, Australia, and New Zealand. Mean change in density is the nnweighted average change in 
density for the countries over the relevant period. 
“1900s: The seven countries are United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, and Australia. 
‘1920s: Exceptions are Sweden and Australia. 
d1930s/World  War 11:  Missing countries are Germany and Austria. 
‘1950s: Norway rises; Italy, France, and Japan have sharp falls. 
‘1 960s: Italy rises; Switzerland falls. 
19  10s: Additional five countries are Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
“stylized” because I have used different-sized time windows for the periods to 
summarize the pattern, but the mean change in density is a “hard’ statistic: the 
unweighted average of changes in density for the countries in the part of  the 
period when they had their spurts. 
Table 8.4 focuses on union density in the depressionlworld War I1 period 
(with somewhat different years shown for the countries to capture the timing 
of their particular spurts). The table shows that union density rose prior to the 
war in several countries, as well as in the United States, though in some cases 
the increase was less concentrated in a few years (the depression experience of 
Denmark, in particular, is misleading as Danish density began trending up ear- 
lier). In the United Kingdom, density jumped from 22.6 percent in  1933 to 
33.1 percent in 1940; in France, density went from 7.0 percent in 1935 to 35 
percent in 1937; in Norway, density increased from 13 percent in  1927 to 43 
percent in 1939; and so on. The similarity in the pattern suggests that unioniza- 
tion during the depression did not reflect country-specific  political events but 
rather a more fundamental response of employees to the depression situation. 
In sum, I conclude that data on union density for the United States and other 
countries show that unionism generally grows in sudden sharp spurts and that 
the depression spurt of unionism in the United States is not an isolated country 
phenomenon but rather exemplifies a general pattern in this seemingly inhospi- 273  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 




Before Spurt  At Peak Spurt  Change per Year 
Australia  34.9 (1933)  38.8 (1939) 
Canada  17.6 (1936)  22.2 (1938) 
Denmark  36.2 (1929)  46.6 (1939) 
France  7.0 (1935)  25.4 (1937) 
Netherlands  26.3 (1928)  43.0 (1932) 
Norway  13.2 (1927)  42.9 (1939) 
Sweden  37.9 (1933)  53.7 (1939) 
Switzerland  21.1 (1928)  27.7 (1932) 
United Kingdom  22.6 (1933)  33.1 (1940) 
United States  11.9 (1934)  28.6 (1939) 
Sources: Bain and Price (1980) and Visser (1989). 











table  period  for  unionism. This  regularity raises  two  questions about  the 
growth of  unionization. Is there is a single social process underlying growth 
by  spurts, and if so, what is that process? Why does union growth occur in 
roughly similar periods across countries, including the depression when one 
might have expected unions to be particularly weak? The former question re- 
lates to the dynamics of growth. The latter relates to its timing. 
8.2  Why Spurts? 
Two types of models can generate spurts in union growth. The first are mod- 
els in which the process of growth creates nonlinearities that produce “phase 
transitions” when certain conditions are met-models  of  tipping, contagion, 
self-organized complexity. The second are standard comparative statics linear 
models in which massive shocks or environmental changes generate commen- 
surately large responses in otherwise stable union membership. The former 
models stress the underlying process by  which organization occurs and the 
cumulative behavior of individual workers, unions, and firms. The focus is on 
the behavior of thousands or millions of individuals acting in response to one 
another. The latter models stress the exogenous shock, usually generated by 
political forces. Historians of unionism in particular countries generally inter- 
pret the growth of unionism in their country as resulting from political “top- 
down” changes: unions grew in the United States because of the Wagner Act, 
in France because of the Blum government, in Canada because of the enact- 
ment of PC 1003, and so on. Without denying the importance of particular laws 
or events as catalysts or triggers for the growth process, I lay out in this section 
a model in which sudden sharp changes in union density-discontinuities- 
arise from the process of organization. 
My model concentrates on two aspects of unionization: the conflict between 274  Richard B. Freeman 
management and labor in the formation of  unions; and nonlinearities in the 
benefits, costs, and strengths that accrue to the two sides from different levels 
of unionization. The model makes union formation an outcome of a battle be- 
tween management and labor, rather than of the “laboratory voting” procedure 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) envisages. Prior to the Wagner 
Act, organization was  largely a matter of  strategic workers using economic 
muscle to force employers to accept a union at their workplaces (Dunlop 1948) 
per the battle motif. Absent the strike threat by  workers to impose economic 
costs on firms, management might refuse to recognize a union even if virtually 
all workers supported it. The result was a large number of often bitter recogni- 
tion strikes during many union spurts. A major goal of the Wagner Act was to 
transform this process into a secret ballot election campaign. 
The  model  generates  nonlinearity  in  organizing  because  the  resources 
unions or employers bring to the campaign and the incentives that they have to 
use their resources to organize or oppose organization depend critically on the 
percentage already organized or covered by collective bargaining in the rele- 
vant market. When union density is low, unions have little strength to organize 
new firms and firms have a large incentive to oppose organization. As union 
density rises, unions have increased resources to use for organizing and firms 
see less competitive disadvantage in being organized. Thus, at some range of 
union density, union organizing strength rises and employer opposition falls, 
potentially producing a spurt in membership. 
The backbone of this model is an accounting identity for union density: 
(1)  UNION,  = (1 - r)*UNION,-,  + NEW,, 
where UNION is union density in a given product market in a particular year, 
defined as the ratio of union members to employment in that sector; r is the 
“normal” rate of depreciation of that density due, say, to attrition of members 
or firms or the  growth of  employment in  new  firms that have not yet been 
organized; and NEW is the ratio of new members organized to employment in 
the given year. 
I define UNION as union density in a product market because the model 
focuses on the effects of unionization on firms that compete in the same area, 
and on the ability of collective bargaining to create a “level playing field” in 
terms of  a single package of wage, benefit, and conditions in that sector that 
can reduce initial employer opposition to unions. 
The key to the model is the rate of new organization, which depends on the 
resources that labor and management devote to organizing or opposing organi- 
zation: 
(2)  NEW  = f(ORG, OPP) , 
where ORG is the resources unions give to organizing and OPP is the resources 
management gives to opposing union drives. 275  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
The functionfis the key element of the model. As written, it is a production 
function of sorts, with df/dORG > 0 and af/aOPP <  0. Beyond this, it is difficult 
to specify functional form. One possibility is that f has diminishing marginal 
productivity in both ORG and OPP, so that, conditional on employer opposi- 
tion, more organizing effort will yield diminished growth of membership and, 
conditional on organizing effort, employer opposition will also have diminish- 
ing returns. But it is also possible that ORG or OPP has increasing marginal 
productivity over some range: a massive union drive might pay off much more 
than a smaller drive; employer opposition around a single banner-the  Ameri- 
can plan-might  be more successful in defeating union organizing than efforts 
by individual employers. 
To close the model requires equations for ORG and OPP. ORG presumably 
depends on existing union resources, the potential benefits to existing members 
from spending their dues money on organizing new members, the benefits to 
nonunion workers of unionization, and so on. One could readily imagine ORG 
resulting from some form of union optimizing behavior. What my model re- 
quires is that at very low levels of unionization, ORG will be small: the union 
simply does not have the resources to devote to organizing campaigns. I expect 
that ORG is also low at high levels of unionization: at high density the union 
will have effective control over the market for labor, and existing members will 
gain little from expanding membership. If union benefits spill over to nonunion 
workers through “threat effects,” new workers may also gain little. For simplic- 
ity,  I postulate that  ORG  rises,  then  falls more or less parabolically, with 
UNION. The OPP relation depends on firms’ estimates of  the benefits and 
costs of operating union or nonunion, their assessment of the likely success of 
efforts to defeat union organizing drives, and the resources they have to combat 
the union. OPP is likely to be high when UNION is low: if the union is too 
weak to establish a level playing field in a sector, firms that are organized risk 
competitive disadvantage by paying higher wages or benefits. OPP may or may 
not be high when UNION is high: a nonunion firm in a primarily union market 
may  find that to maintain this status, it must operate by union rules and pay 
union or higher wages or spend considerable resources fighting organizing 
drives, reducing the incentive to oppose union organizing efforts. On the other 
hand, if the firm can remain nonunion and avoid sharing economic rents with 
workers, it may be able to earn exceptionally high profits. As the analytics 
require only a single nonlinearity in the relation between union density and the 
resources devoted to the process of gaining new members, I assume for sim- 
plicity that employer opposition is simply a declining function of UNION. 
The result is a nonlinear  difference equation that readily generates sharp 
jumps in union density.’ Figure 8.2  captures the essential nonlinearity. In panel 
A of figure 8.2 there are two stable union equilibria, 0 and U*,  and one unstable 
1. In the simple case where ORG= a.  UNION-, -  b .  (UNION_,)Z  andOPP= 6- c.  UNION-,, 
the difference equation is second order. A  Organizing Resources (ORG) 
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Fig. 8.2  Nonlinearity and spurts: A,  stable and unstable equilibria in union 
spurt model; B, discontinuous  jump in density when organizing resources rise 277  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
equilibrium,  U‘. Union density grows whenever ORG exceeds OPP (more 
properly, when NEW =f(ORG, OPP) > r *  UNION-,). In panel B of the figure 
I assume that the initial unionization point is 0 (or some other low level). Be- 
ginning at 0, a gradual increase in the union-employee desire for organization, 
which shifts upward the ORG curve, or a gradual decrease in employer opposi- 
tion to unionization, which shifts downward the OPP curve, has no effect on 
union  density until a critical point is reached: the point where ORG(0) > 
OPP(0). In panel B the increase in the organizing function to ORG* creates 
this situation. The result is a sudden spurt in density to the equilibrium U*. 
As it stands, this model predicts both sudden spurts and sharp declines in 
union density. But in the United States (and many other countries), it is difficult 
to displace unions in workplaces where they exist. The Wagner Act made that 
particularly difficult by requiring a decertification process so that a firm could 
end a union  relationship only when workers voted to decertify the union, 
though a firm with strong bargaining power could effectively eliminate unions 
by refusing to come to a collective bargaining agreement and bringing in re- 
placement workers to take the jobs of union members if the union struck. For 
the United States, though, I assume that shifts in ORG or OPP that reduce 
density do not have such a discontinuous effect and make the maximum loss 
of density in a given period r  *  UNION-,. Thus, the nonlinearity of the model 
transforms gradual changes in the underlying desire for or opposition to union- 
ism into jumps to a new equilibrium on the growth side but produces gradual 
drops in density on the decline side. 
The point of  this exercise is not to derive “the” union growth or decline 
equations applicable to all institutional settings or time periods but rather to 
highlight the potential for producing endogenous spurts when union and firms 
battle over organizing drives, given the likely relation between their allocation 
of  resources to organizing or opposing activity and extant density. The key 
condition for growth spurts rather than gradual growth of unionization is con- 
frontation over the union institution. The logic of  the model suggests that in 
the early phase of  a spurt there will be considerable conflict but that this con- 
flict will diminish as the incentive for firms to oppose unions falls with higher 
levels of density, and that unionism will be concentrated in selected sectors as 
opposed to being evenly spread across sectors in the workforce. It makes prod- 
uct markets critical in analyzing union growth. 
To go further, it is necessary to specify the factors likely to shift the ORG 
and OPP schedules over time in a particular setting. For the United States in 
the depression period, these factors include the New Deal labor policies, nota- 
bly the Wagner Act that most labor historians stress; the attitudes of workers, 
dependent on their assessment of the likely benefits and costs of unionization; 
the resources and incentives facing firms; and the resources and incentives of 
unions, including innovations in union structure, such as the formation of the 
CIO under John L. Lewis. The magnitude of the depression and consequent 
loss of  belief in business leadership offers a potentially strong candidate for 278  Richard B. Freeman 
raising worker desire for unionization, which in the framework given above 
shifts the ORG curve. In other time periods, such as the World War I or World 
War I1 spurts, economic booms might have reduced employer opposition, mak- 
ing unionization easier, even absent a change in ORG. For other countries, one 
may come up with a similar list of incentives to governments, employees, and 
firms and unions that arguably shifted over time. Since institutions affect com- 
pensation and benefit packages, moreover, the same economic changes might 
alter the benefits and costs to different parties differently in different countries. 
For example, in a European country with extension of  collective bargaining 
contracts (from the organized sector to nonunionized firms), the incentive of 
employers to oppose unions will be much less than in a country with plant- or 
firm-level bargaining. But the task of this paper is not to explain unionization 
around the world but to use that and other evidence to cast light on the most 
dramatic period of U.S. union history. 
8.3  The Depression and World War I1 Spurts in the United States 
The 1934-39  depression spurt and the World War I1 spurt raised U.S. union 
density to unprecedented levels and seemed, through the  1960s at least, to 
make unions a permanent and accepted part of American society. During both 
spurts there was a substantial increase in density in private sector industries 
outside of the services but little growth of density in the service sector or gov- 
ernment (table 8.5). The World War  I1 spurt fits an overall pattern in which 
unionism grows in war periods (recall the growth throughout the advanced 
world in World War I), as governments seek to maximize production by min- 
imizing labor disputes. Most labor experts would predict a growth of unionism 
in such a time period. But the depression-era spurt came as a shock to the 
experts of its period. In 1932 George Barnett, president of the American Eco- 
nomic Association  (AEA) and  an  expert  in  industrial relations,  declared: 
“American trade unionism is slowly being  limited in influence by  changes 
which destroy the basis on which it is erected. . . . I see no reason to believe 
that American trade unionism will . .  .  become in the next decade a more potent 
social influence” (1933,6). Perhaps in no other period of American history has 
the growth of unionism seemed so surprising. 
There are two interpretations of the causes of the 1930s spurt in the United 
States, each focused on the possible catalytic role of particular social actors. 
The first interpretation, which I will call the top-down hypofhesis,  is that the 
1930s growth resulted from the decisions of the Roosevelt administration, the 
passage of prolabor New Deal legislation, and the formation of the CIO by  a 
group of innovative union leaders led by John L. Lewis. Many analysts adhere 
to the view that a sympathetic administration in Washington was necessary, 
and perhaps even sufficient, to spark the growth of unions. They place great 
weight on the enactment of the National Industrial Relations Act (NIRA) and 
the Wagner Act. Some have gone so far as to call the Wagner Act “the most 279  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
Table 8.5  Union Density of Industries during the Depression and World War I1 
spurts 
Year 
Industry  1933  1935  1939  1947 
Manufacturing= 
Manufacturingb 
Metals and machinery 
Clothing 
Food, drink, and tobacco 
Paper, printing, and 
Leather and leather products 
Chemicals, rubber, clay, 
Textiles 




Building and construction 



















































Sources: Bain and Price (1980) and U.S. Department of Commerce (1966). 
”This line is from Bain and Price (1980, table 3.3). 
hThese  lines are obtained by dividing union membership from Bain and Price (1980, table 3.4) by 
employment data from the US.  Department of Commerce (1966). 
radical piece of legislation ever enacted” (Klare 1978, 265). Bemstein (1971) 
devoted much of his prologue chapter to Roosevelt and his administration be- 
cause he believed that the coming of the New Deal was the key event in Ameri- 
can labor history. Taft claimed that “the change in the future of American labor 
which took place in 1933 was almost entirely due to the legislative measures 
. . . of  FDR’ (1964, 416). Goldfield (1989) attributes similar views to many 
other analysts: Bums (1956), Derber and Young  (19S7),  Schlesinger (19S8), 
Leuchtenberg (1963), and Freidel (1952). The act aside, when unions can de- 
clare that “the President wants you to join” (as in one CIO organizing poster), 
surely it had to matter somewhat. A variant of the top-down hypothesis is that 
the leadership provided by John L. Lewis in forming the CIO was also a critical 
component in growth. According to Taft, “The CIO was largely the creation of 
John L. Lewis without whose leadership and financing the movement would 
have  foundered and expired” (1964, xx). Taft’s  story is basically that if  you 
removed FDR and Lewis, nothing much would have happened on the union 
front during the depression. 
The second interpretation is quite different. It is that the catalyst for the 280  Richard B. Freeman 
1930s spurt was the grievances of employees and their loss of faith in business 
leadershlp. Government policies and union leadership were endogenous re- 
sponses to the changed views of employees. Since the spark for union growth 
emanates from workers, I call this the bottom-up hypothesis. Horace Davis’s 
theory of union growth exemplifies this view: “When labor has major griev- 
ances and an improving position in the labor market, unions tend to grow” 
(1941,623). He argues that the grievance-loss  of jobs or risk thereof-was 
exceptional during the depression and that the direction of  movement in the 
economy, rather than the level, was critical in allowing unions to develop. In 
this view, unionism can grow during an economic recovery, even if the recov- 
ery is still associated with high joblessness. This hypothesis stresses the activi- 
ties of  workers, firms, and unions operating as individual agents, whose col- 
lective action determines unionization and  influences governmental policy. 
Absent FDR  and the Wagner Act and John L. Lewis, there still would have 
been substantial growth of unionization in the late 1930s, according to this hy- 
pothesis. 
There are problems in differentiating  between these explanations.  The 1930s 
spurt occurred during the New Deal, was accompanied by the CIO split, and 
occurred during a period of recovery from economic recession. One could le- 
gitimately argue that the spurt began when a weighted sum of  contributing 
factors, Cw,X,,  exceeded some critical value, where Xi  measures one of  the 
factors and w,  is its effect on unionization. In figure 8.2, ORG -  OPP would 
depend on this sum. In this case, the issue of deciding between the two inter- 
pretations is not one of accepting either the top-down story or the bottom-up 
story but of  partitioning the weighted sum to determine which set of  factors 
was more important. Such a calculation would presumably give some weight 
to all factors and thus lead to a multicausal explanation of the spurt that would 
not reject either hypothesis. But the counterfactual  for determining what would 
happen absent an observed X should not be a simple ceteris paribus thought 
experiment in  which one removes X and  holds everything else the  same. 
Rather, the counterfactual requires a more complex thought experiment that 
assesses how the remaining factors might adjust to the change. Perhaps absent 
one factor, other causal factors would have increased sufficiently to keep the 
weighted sum above the critical value. In the case of  the  1930s depression 
spurt, had Congress failed to enact the Wagner Act, might unions have ex- 
panded more through traditional recognition strikes? Absent John L. Lewis 
and the CIO, would AFL unions have eventually responded to the opportunities 
afforded by  worker discontent in mass production industries, or might some 
other entrepreneurial union leader have stepped forward to take greater initia- 
tive than the AFL had shown up to that point? Or might another form of worker 
organization have come forth to unionize the mass production industries? 
To  assess the top-down and bottom-up interpretations  of the depression -era 
spurt, I have examined three aspects of the unionization drive of the period: the 
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strikes the legislation was designed to supplant, the extent to which the new 
CIO unions were in fact aided by the CIO, and the extent to which the old AFL 
unions responded to the new situation. If the top-down analysis is correct, I 
would expect (1) that recognition strikes would not continue to be a major 
mode of unionization once the benefits of the secret ballot process were estab- 
lished, (2) that the bulk of  the new unions in the CIO would have relied on 
central funds or organizing assistance, and (3) that the AFL unions, which 
lacked the dynamic leadership of Lewis, and which were less favored by  the 
New Deal than the CJO, would gain fewer members than the CIO unions. 
Data relating to all three of these “tests” reject the top-down hypothesis in 
favor of  an explanation of the depression-era spurt that places greater weight 
on the independent activities of workers and local unions in a bottom-up or- 
ganizing effort. From this perspective the Wagner Act was less an exogenous 
change in regime that caused the union spurt and more an endogenous outcome 
of unionizing pressures-a  government means for channeling worker desires 
for unionism and employer opposition into a less violent and confrontational 
mode for determining organization and collective bargaining arrangements. 
This does not mean that the act had no effect on the events of the period, but 
that absent the act or in the presence of, say, a weaker labor law, there still 
would have been a major union spurt in the depression period. 
Consider first the evidence on recognition strikes. Despite the creation of 
the NLRB and “laboratory” elections for workers to choose whether or not 
they wanted to unionize, a huge number of  workers were organized in the 
1930s and through the war years by recognition strikes. In 1934, when Roose- 
velt ordered the pre-Wagner  Act Labor Board to conduct bargaining elections, 
there were 562 recognition strikes involving over 700,000 workers. Table 8.6 
shows that the number of  workers involved in recognition strikes varied in 
ensuing years, trending downward as the National Labor Relations Act proce- 
dures become increasingly accepted but still remaining high as late as 1937, 
when the Supreme Court declared the Wagner Act constitutional.2 More sur- 
prising is the fact that recognition strikes were also an important method of 
organizing in  1941, 1944, and 1945. Overall, more workers were organized 
through recognition strikes during  the  1934-39  spurt  than were organized 
through NLRB elections:  1.8 million through recognition strikes versus 1  .0 
million via NLRB elections. This suggests that the act may have changed the 
nature or process of union organization after 1937 more than it changed the 
actual number organized.  A legitimate interpretation of the data is that the elec- 
tion procedure largely substituted for recognition strikes that would have cre- 
2. The timing of  the legal changes deserves some attention. On  16 June  1933, the NIRA was 
signed into law. The first code, with a statement on unionization, was given in July. In 1934 Roose- 
velt ordered the Labor Board to conduct bargaining elections, and they held 528 elections with 
approximately 30,000 votes. On 27 May 1935, the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitu- 
tional in the Schechter Poultry Co.  decision. The Congress passed the WagnerAct on 27 July 1935. 
The act was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v.  Jones and Loughlin (April 1937). 282  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.6  Number of Workers Organized by Way of Recognition Strikes and by 
NRLB  Elections 
~  ~~~ 
No. of  Percentage of 
No. of  Organized by  No. of Workers  Unionized by 
No. of  Workers in  Recognition  No. of  in Election Units  Recognition 
Year  Strikes  Strikes  (A)  Elections  (B  )  (AMA + B) 
Workers  Workers 
Recognition  Recognition  Strikes  Recognition  Voting Union  Strikes 
1934  562 
1935  5  60 
1936  809 
1937  2,200 
1938  867 
1939  885 
1940  767 
1941  1,466 
1942  684 
I943  244 
1944  389 
1945  592 
701,101 
202.1 18 




7  1,054 



















































Source: Recognition strike data from the US.  Department of Labor, BLS, Monthly Labor Review (Wash- 
ington, D.C., May 1936-May 1946,  January 1986). 
Notes: 1 estimated the number organized by  recognition strikes by  multiplying the number reported in- 
volved in those strikes by the percentage of workers the BLS reported as being involved in recognition 
strikes where the outcome was substantial or partial gains to the union. Election statistics are from NLRB, 
Annual Report (Washington, D.C., June 1936-June 1946), with the monthly NLRB data adjusted from a 
fiscal year basis to be on a calendar year comparable to the strike data. From  1936 to  1945 the NLRB 
reported the number of workers eligible to vote and the number who voted union but not the number in 
elections  where the union won. In a term paper (Giebisch  1979).  Robert Giebisch estimated that the 
number of workers in units won by the union was  15 percent higher than the number who voted union. 
The number of workers in election units voting union is based on this adjustment. 
ated a comparable growth of unionism in a more confrontational way. If this is 
the case, the claim that the depression-based spurt was bottom-up driven rather 
than top-down driven is enhanced. How many workers might have successfully 
unionized through 1939 in the absence of  an election procedure? A minimal 
estimate would be  the  number who in  fact  organized through recognition 
strikes: the  1.8 million workers organized through recognition strikes is 33 
percent of the 1934-39  growth in union membership of 5.5 million reported 
in table 8A.2. Many workers, of course, joined existing unions so that member- 
ship rose absent either strikes or NLRB elections. If  this growth was  simply 
proportionate  to  the  growth  of  nonagricultural employment,  membership 
would have risen by  18 percent from 1934 to 1939, or by 900,000 persons. I 
will not try to predict how many persons would have joined unions over the 
1937-45  period absent the Wagner Act but will simply note that the growth in 
the latter period was comparable to that during World War I, with no New 
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Consider next the evidence on the growth of  CIO unions. How  much of 
CIO membership growth resulted largely from the activities of workers and 
autonomous unions and how much from top-down central CIO assistance? 
Two of the most important organizing drives in the 1930s and 1940s were 
in automobiles and steel, both highly oligopolized sectors with a large domi- 
nant firm whose unionization virtually guaranteed success in the sector. The 
automobile workers, employing the sit-down strike, forced General Motors to 
accept their organization after numerous abortive efforts. But the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) did not rely intensively on CIO monies for its organizing suc- 
cess or on Lewis or other CIO leadership for its operations. The history of the 
union is a story of  workers trying to organize, subject to generally bungled 
efforts by the AFL to provide leadership and aided only modestly by the CIO 
leadership. 
The organization of the steelworkers was quite different. In steel, the CIO 
set up and funded the Steelworkers Organizing Committee (SWOC), and the 
United Mine Workers provided organizers and money as well as Philip Murray, 
the Steelworkers Union’s first president. Much of the growth, however, came 
by gaining the support of the company unions that the steel firms had set up to 
buffer themselves from independent unions, which makes it clear that there 
was an important bottom-up character to this drive as well. Still, the great suc- 
cess of the SWOC came with the negotiations between Lewis and the head of 
the U.S. Steel Corporation, Myron Taylor-a  closed-door meeting that orga- 
nized the largest company without a strike. The Steelworkers is the prime ex- 
ample of a union that fits the top-down model. 
To what extent did the organization of workers in CIO unions follow the 
UAW  bottom-up pattern as opposed to the Steelworkers top-down pattern? 
One way to answer this question is to categorize CIO unions according to the 
financial and organizing resources that the federation gave them and to contrast 
the membership or growth of  membership in those unions over the relevant 
time period. Table 8.7 presents data on the amount of money the CIO gave to 
various unions from 1935 to 1941 and gives the dollars per member of each 
union in 1937. While financial support is not the sole indicator of CIO effort, 
it is an important measure of how involved the central federation was in partic- 
ular organizing campaigns. The table shows wide variation in the absolute 
amount of money given and in the amount given per member. Consistent with 
the history  of  unionization in autos and  steel, the UAW  received relatively 
little money while the Steelworkers obtained a lot. Table 8.8 contrasts the 1942 
membership in the various CIO unions according to the amount of CIO support 
given per member in 1937. I treat the unions receiving less than $2.00 per 1937 
member as organized independently of  the CIO, those receiving more than 
$5.00 per member as being dependent on the CIO, and unions receiving be- 
tween $2.00 and $5.00 as being in an intermediate group. A classification of 
this type, based on a single indicator, is rough but, as noted in the auto and steel 
cases, my classification is generally consistent with the histories of particular Table 8.7  Assistance Given by the CIO to National Affiliates, 1935-41, and 
Estimated Assistance per Member in the Affiliates as of 1937 
Union 
Assistance 
Total Assistance  per Member 
















Iron, Steel, and Tin 
Longshore 
Marine Engineers 
Marine and Shipbuilding 
Maritime 
Mine, Mill, and Smelter 
Newspaper Guild 





Radio and Telegraph 
Retail and  Department 
Rubber 
Shoe 




Toy and Novelty 















































































Sources: Total assistance from Galenson (1960, table 26);  for assistance per member, I divided 
total assistance by union membership in 1937 from Troy (1965, table A-2). When Troy reported 
no membership in a given year, I have taken the membership in the nearest available year. 285  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
Table 8.8  Membership in CIO Unions in 1942, According to Dependence on 
CIO for Financial Assistance 
Dollars of Aid per 
1937 Member,  No. of  Membership 
1935-41  Unions  in 1942  Major Unions in Group 
Less than $2  15  1,055,000  UAW, Electrical, Rubber 
$2-$5  10  379,000  Textile, Marine and Shipbuilding 
More than $5  12  584,600  Steel, Construction District 50 
Notes:  Calculated from table 8.7 and membership data from Troy (1965, table A-2). Includes only 
unions given some central supprt. Thus, ACW, UMW, and ILGWU, among others are excluded 
from the data. When a union was not affiliated with the CIO (UMW, District 50, left with the 
UMW), I used the most recent CIO affiliation year. 
unions. The striking fact is that in 1942 the CIO was not dominated by unions 
whose formation and growth had depended greatly on CIO financial and or- 
ganizing support. There are more than twice as many members in the unions 
that received relatively little CIO financial support than in those that received 
considerable support. One reason is that the CIO gave considerable money to 
some organizing drives, such as for construction workers, that had relatively 
little success (and were motivated less by  the desire of workers to join CIO 
unions than  by  John L.  Lewis’s  desire to  create trouble for the AFL craft 
unions). 
The most dramatic histories of the depression spurt focus on the growth of 
the new CIO industrial unions, but a major component of union expansion in 
the period was the AFL response to the new competing federation (Galenson 
1960). Indeed, the absolute growth of  membership in AFL unions exceeded 
the growth in CIO unions, even if we count the CIO as having no members 
prior to 1937 (although some founding organizations like the Miners were al- 
ready large). 
Between  1935 and  1942 the AFL gained 2.7 million members compared 
with a gain of  2.5 million for the CIO (see table 8.9). Several AFL unions 
made particularly large gains in the period: the Machinists, which had opposed 
industrial unionism in internal AFX debates, but which transformed itself into 
“one of  the great mass production unions in the country” (Galenson 1960, 
141), in part to cypete  with the UAW  in areas like airplane production; the 
Teamsters, which debeloped regional conferences to create a multiindustry 
general transport workers’ union; the Carpenters (whose head, Bill Hutcheson, 
was the man Lewis punched when he quit the AFL to form the CIO); the Rail- 
way  Clerks; and the Building Laborers; though membership grew in other 
unions as well. To some extent, AFL unions were galvanized to fight for mem- 
bership by  rival CIO unions that threatened their jurisdictions rather than by 
the opportunities created by  the Wagner Act election procedure per se. But 
they were also galvanized by  worker desires to unionize in response to the 
depression conditions. The problem for the AFL unions was to get their “act in 286  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.9  Membership in the AFL and CIO, 193542  (thousands) 
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Source: Troy (1965, table A-I). 
gear” to take advantage of a market opportunity created more by  worker de- 
sires than by government legislation. 
Only three AFL (later CIO) unions exploited the opportunity first created by 
the Roosevelt administration’s NIRA to build or rebuild their membership 
base: the United Mine Workers (UMW), the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
(ACW), and the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU). All 
three unions operated in competitive industries. All had experienced periods 
of great growth followed by collapses throughout their histories. From 1927 to 
1933 in particular, the UMW, then the largest exemplar of industrial unionism 
in the United States, had suffered massive losses of membership. The success 
of each of these unions depended critically on establishing some form of  na- 
tional or at least regional wage pattern, so that firms that signed with the union 
were not driven out of  business by  nonunion competitors. Thus, the NIRA 
gave them a particular institutional setting through which to develop sectoral 
agreements. The UMW accomplished this in part through bargaining with the 
bituminous coal manufacturers’ federation and effectively helping them to oli- 
gopolize the industry. The ACW  and  ILGWU did the  same in  the  major 
apparel-producing areas in the North but failed to extend their organizations 
to the South. Most of  the successful new  CIO unions, by  contrast, were in 
industries dominated by a few large employers, often located in a single area: 
steel, autos, rubber. The great success of  the AFL construction unions in the 
late 1930s reflected their monopoly of skilled crafts workers in particular local- 
ities, where organization depended largely on the activities of local unionists. 
In sum, to understand the development of  unionism during the Great De- 
pression, it is more useful to think of an endogenous bottom-up response op- 287  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
erating during a period of great change in worker desire for unionism than of 
a legalistic top-down unionization drive. 
8.4  Conclusion: What Does a Defining Period Define? 
For a particular event to be “defining,” it must lock in certain outcomes that 
persist into some future period when, given a blank slate, the society could 
have developed something very different. Historians and labor analysts writing 
in 1950s and 1960s believed that the depression spurt and the Wagner Act were 
such events, producing a substantial and stable collective bargaining  system 
for the United States. According to Fleming, the Wagner Act “unquestionably 
contributed enormously to the growth of a large and independent labor move- 
ment . . . and to the . . . acceptance of that movement as a desirable part of a 
modern American society” (1957, 149). Bernstein wrote that “American labor 
history took an eventful turn with the coming of the New Deal” (197 1, ix). In 
1964 Taft contrasted the labor movement “of today” with the “one that existed 
in the early 1930s:’  noting that “its numbers are about six times as great, and 
the level upon which it operates its legal, political, and research activities has 
been greatly expanded” (1964,708). 
In 1997 the effect of  the depression and World War I1 spurts on union density 
and the U.S. labor relations system appears quite different. Private sector union 
density has dropped to the levels of the mid- 1900s. The social accord that made 
unions a part of national  decision making has broken down. An increasing 
number of employers seek the “union-free’’ environment that only retrograde 
right-wing ideologues once sought. Many firms that do not espouse the union- 
free world act as if that is what they truly want when their own workforce seeks 
to organize. The depression and World War I1 growth of unionism thus looks 
more like a diversion from American “exceptionalism”-a  long and important 
diversion, but a diversion nonetheless-rather  than a critical turning point in 
labor relations. 
This does not, however, mean that the period did not leave a lasting legacy. 
What remains to this day is the nation’s legal framework for conducting private 
sector labor relations:  a national  labor code, based  on the Wagner Act  as 
amended in ensuing years. This is a framework that is arguably outmoded. One 
major purpose of the act-to  encourage collective bargaining-has  failed: the 
proportion  of nonagricultural  workers in unions is below what it was in the 
five depression years prior to its enactment. From the union side, the Wagner 
Act turned the process of unionization into a legalistic business, in which fimns 
and union organizers battle before the NLRB and courts as part of the election 
process. The protections that the act gave to workers who want to unionize 
have de facto been eliminated as the number of unfair practices committed by 
employers per election has risen sharply. Never envisaging a world in which 
upward of 35 percent of nonmanagerial workers would supervise others, where 
white-collar managerial and professional jobs would constitute the dominant 288  Richard B. Freeman 
occupations, the act, with its Taft-Hartley amendments, fails to provide any 
place for intermediate organizations-staff  associations, works councils, or 
more pejoratively company unions-that  some of these workers may prefer to 
the stark “collective bargaining or nothing” choice that the Wagner Act offers. 
The labor relations code provides no place for unions of  supervisors, profes- 
sionals, or managers. From the employer side, the act makes it illegal for firms 
to set up and support worker organizations that might give some legitimate 
voice to workers who want some organization at their workplace short of an 
independent union that bargains collectively (the “company union”). Perhaps 
most important, the NLRB representation procedure has not reduced the con- 
frontation between management and employees over unionization but has sim- 
ply transferred it from one setting to another. By contrast, state regulation of 
public sector labor relations has produced what the Wagner Act has not-a 
stable collective bargaining system in that part of the economy with much less 
confrontation in the organizing process. As  the laws governing unionization 
in  the public and private  sectors are reasonably similar, this  difference in 
outcomes is probably due to the smaller incentive and willingness of man- 
agers in the public sector than of managers in the private sector to fight union 
drives. Public sector managers are not motivated by  corporate profit to op- 
pose unionism. 
My view that the Wagner Act has locked the United States into an outmoded 
labor relations framework that does not fit labor market realities as the country 
moves into the twenty-first century is not an isolated one. Many labor experts 
concur that the Wagner Act framework no longer fits the U.S. economy, though 
they often disagree about the specifics of labor law reform, as can be seen in 
the differing views given by labor, management, and independent scholars be- 
fore the 1993-94  Commission on the Future of Worker-Management  Relations 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1994a, 1994b).  Workers, firms, union membership, 
and the economy have changed greatly since the 1930s. But, despite several 
amendments to the Wagner Act, the basic structure of the law has not changed, 
creating an institutional straitjacket that helps neither U.S. workers, nor firms, 
nor unions, but one that has proved difficult to change, given the fears of labor 
and management that any shifts in the law will tilt the balance of power against 
their side. The lesson I draw from the depression spurt is that these fears are 
probably ill placed. No plausible “labor law reform” is likely to induce a burst 
of unionism in the United States. The lesson from the depression experience 
is that bottom-up employee-driven bursts of union activity rather than particu- 
lar laws are necessary for any resurgence of union density. Another lesson is 
that any such resurgence of unionism will come suddenly, probably surprising 
the current crop of experts and labor historians as much as the depression spurt 
surprised Barnett and other observers of the period. 289  Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes 
Appendix 
Union Membership and Density Estimates 
There are alternative estimates of union membership for the United States that 
cover the depression era (and earlier) through the 1990s. These include Troy’s 
(1965), Troy  and Sheflin’s (1985), and those of  the BLS (reported in diverse 
publications such as various statistical abstracts and BLS bulletins, such as 
US. Department of Labor, BLS 1980). Galenson (1960,584-87)  reports dif- 
ferent numbers for various unions in the depression period and describes some 
of the problems of determining membership at a time when unions were com- 
peting. He also contrasts “his” estimates with those of Wolman. There are dif- 
ferences between convention strength and membership claims, differences be- 
tween members in good standing and dues-paying members, that produce wide 
variation. Even the head of the CIO, Philip Murray, was uncertain about mem- 
bership in  1939, when per capita payments gave a membership estimate of  1.7 
million: “He indicated that many affiliates were not paying their per capita fees 
to the CIO, and that actual membership might be as high as 3,000,000’ (Ga- 
lenson 1960, 585). The contemporaneous BLS estimate for 1939 was 4 mil- 
lion. Given these differences, it is not surprising that while all extant estimated 
series show a sharp increase in membership from 1935 through 1939 and from 
1941 or  1942 through 1945, the timing and magnitude of  the changes does 
differ, in some cases for reasons that are unclear. In table 8A.  1, I report five 
different union membership series for 1933-48  that show the range of  varia- 
tion in these estimates. The differences among the series are largest in  1936 
Table 8A.1  Union Membership (thousands) 
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and 1937, when the BLS data show a much greater spurt in membership than 
the Troy, Troy and Sheflin, or Galenson series does. The Wolman series shows 
a large increase in membership for 1936-37  but still falls short of the change 
in membership in the BLS data. The differences in the series imply somewhat 
different timing and magnitudes for the depression-era spurt, but all still show 
sizable gains in membership. The BLS series also shows a larger increase in 
1942-43 than the Troy or Troy and Sheflin series. But since the Troy and Troy 
and Sheflin data are roughly comparable to the BLS data in 1948, they show 
larger estimated increases in union membership from 1944 to 1948 than does 
the BLS series. 
Why do the series differ? The BLS and Troy data differ presumably because 
the Troy figures are based on dues-paying membership while the BLS data are 
derived from union reports, which may include persons who do not pay dues, 
particularly in  1937. Troy  and Sheflin are based on the earlier Troy  figures, 
with adjustments from fiscal year to calendar year, but this does not readily 
explain some of the differences between these series, particularly in 1933 and 
1934. The Galenson series uses AFL and independent union data together with 
Philip Murray’s estimates for the CIO, which may have understated even dues- 
paying membership, as individual unions sought to keep more of the dues for 
themselves. 
There is no strong reason to prefer the BLS or Troy or Troy and Sheflin data 
for analyzing union growth in the United States. But because I  am uneasy 
about the unexplained changes between the Troy estimates and the Troy and 
Sheflin estimates and have a mild  preference for measures that reflect  the 
broadest possible membership in unions to those limited to annual dues-paying 
members, as the former may give a better indication of changes in periods of 
rapid growth, I base my estimates on the BLS series spliced to other series. 
Use of any of the other series or variants of the particular splicing that I chose 
will not, however, affect the basic findings or analysis. 
The estimates reported in table 8A.2 provide one continuous union member- 
ship series from 1880 to 1995, together with a single nonagricultural employ- 
ment series, from which I derive a density series. The union membership fig- 
ures refer to U.S. union members only. To obtain the figures, I spliced together 
three different series. The 1995 numbers come from U.S. Department of Labor, 
BLS (1996). For the period  1983-94,  I  use the numbers reported from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) in Bureau of  National Affairs (1  995, table 
I), with the 1981 number based on the reported percentage of wage and salary 
workers who were union members. As there are no numbers for 1982, I esti- 
mated membership in that year by  assuming the change between 1981 and 
1983 was proportionate to the change given in Troy and Sheflin (1985, table 
3-10).  For 1978-80,  I use the CPS numbers reported in Bureau of  National 
Affairs (1983, table  1). For  1930-77,  I use the series reported by  the U.S. 
Department of Labor, BLS (1980), spliced to be consistent with the CPS at the 
1978 overlap year between the BLS and CPS series. For the period 1897-1929 Table 8A.2  New Estimates of Union Membership and Union Density in the 
United States, 1880-1995 
Estimated  Nonagricultural  Union 
Membership  Employment  Density 
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4,269 
3,571 




























































































11.23 Table SA.2  (continued) 
Estimated  Nonagricultural  Union 
Membership  Employment  Density 
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Table 8A.2  (continued) 
Year 
Estimated  Nonagricultural  Union 
Membership  Employment  Density 





































































































I use the BLS series reported in U.S. Bureau of  the Census (1960, series D- 
735), adjusted so that the data refer to U.S. members of unions on the basis of 
the U.S. proportion of labor union membership in 1930 in series D-741 and D- 
742. This eliminates Canadian members of U.S. unions. For the period 1880- 
1913 I  used  the series of  union  membership  reported  by  Gerald Friedman 
(1995), spliced to the BLS series (itself adjusted to be on a CPS-comparable 
basis) at the overlap year 1914. 
The nonagricultural  employment series is derived from several sources as 
well. For 1966-95,  I used the Economic Report of the President (Council of 
Economic Advisers 1996, table B-42). For  1930-65,  I used the data in U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1966, series A-88). For 1900-1929, I used the data 
in the U.S. Department of Commerce (1966, series A-87). For 1889-99, I used 
series A70 from the same volume; those data are an index of  man-hours in 
nonagricultural industries, and I applied the index numbers to the 1900  nonag- 
ricultural employment data in series A-87. Finally, as there are no annual non- 
agricultural employment series prior to 1889, I estimated employment by as- 
suming that it grew proportionate to population, as reported in series A-106. 294  Richard B. Freeman 
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